New Strategies Proposed for Global Nuclear Monitoring Amid Treaty Expirations
For decades, nuclear powers around the globe have functioned within a complex web of treaties designed to progressively reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons. However, with these agreements increasingly falling by the wayside, a credible alternative for monitoring these arsenals has yet to emerge. To address this pressing issue, experts suggest an innovative approach involving satellites and artificial intelligence to oversee the world’s nuclear capabilities.
Matt Korda, an associate director at the Federation of American Scientists, highlights this new proposition as a necessary “plan B” in light of the absence of effective arms control measures. In a report co-authored with Igor Morić, Korda outlines a concept referred to as “cooperative technical means,” suggesting that advancements in satellite technology could fulfill the roles previously held by physical inspections. This shift to remote monitoring aims to mitigate the risks associated with nuclear proliferation in a climate of declining international trust.
Korda emphasizes the potential of artificial intelligence in this context. He notes that AI is particularly adept at pattern recognition, positing that, given a sufficiently large and well-curated dataset, an AI model could be trained to detect subtle changes in nuclear facilities and potentially identify specific weapon systems. This capability could enhance monitoring efforts, providing greater assurance against clandestine nuclear developments.
The backdrop to this proposal is the recent expiration of the New START treaty, which had successfully limited the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. Although both nations are reportedly maintaining the current status quo, the end of this treaty raises concerns about renewed arms races, particularly as both countries allocate significant resources towards building new nuclear capabilities. With nations such as China ramping up their missile production and others like South Korea contemplating their own nuclear options, the need for reliable oversight becomes even more critical.
Korda and Morić advocate for utilizing existing satellite infrastructure in order to negotiate and enforce new treaties. With nations resistant to having inspectors physically present on their territory, the adaptation of remote monitoring could serve as a more politically viable solution. By deploying sophisticated AI systems to analyze monitoring data, this approach aims to maintain oversight without intrusive measures.
While Korda acknowledges the imperfections of this proposal, he argues it represents a more proactive option than the current status of nuclear arms oversight. The substantial reduction of nuclear weapons from over 60,000 in 1985 to just over 12,000 today reflects decades of diplomatic efforts, and the collapse of treaties like New START undermines this progress. Historically, on-site inspections have promoted trust and facilitated the de-escalation of nuclear tensions, a dynamic that has since eroded in the current geopolitical landscape.
In formulating their proposal, Korda and Morić seek to establish a middle ground between total absence of arms control and traditional inspection methods that may no longer be feasible. They focus on how remote monitoring can provide verification without requiring intrusive measures, emphasizing the need for cooperation amongst nuclear powers to enable such a regime.
The use of a network of satellites to monitor key facilities, including intercontinental ballistic missile silos, mobile launchers, and plutonium production sites, presents a significant challenge. Effective implementation would certainly depend on achieving consensus among nuclear states, underscoring the complexities involved in redefining global nuclear oversight in a rapidly changing world.
In summary, as the landscape of nuclear diplomacy shifts and traditional verification methods wane, the advent of satellite-based monitoring combined with AI offers a promising, albeit imperfect, framework for future arms control efforts. This proposition aims to ensure continued vigilance over nuclear arsenals, amidst an environment where geopolitical trust hangs in the balance and risks of escalation loom large.