A recent report highlights the discovery of new vulnerabilities in the WPA3 WiFi security standard, raising significant concerns for businesses relying on this technology. This revelation comes from a trusted team of cybersecurity researchers who previously identified multiple severe flaws—collectively labeled “Dragonblood”—in WPA3 shortly after its launch. The newly uncovered weaknesses could allow malicious actors to exploit WPA3 to gain unauthorized access to WiFi passwords.
WPA, or WiFi Protected Access, employs the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to authenticate wireless devices and safeguard data against eavesdropping. After the release of the WiFi Protected Access III protocol aimed at ameliorating the vulnerabilities of its predecessor, WPA2, it was anticipated that WPA3 would bolster security in wireless communications. However, researchers Mathy Vanhoef and Eyal Ronen have shown that even with the updated protocols, exploitable security gaps remain present.
The initial set of vulnerabilities allowed an attacker to compromise WiFi passwords through timing and cache-based side-channel leaks. In response, the WiFi Alliance issued patches and security recommendations; however, these measures have proven insufficient, exposing a second series of side-channel vulnerabilities that can still be exploited by savvy hackers.
The first vulnerability, identified as CVE-2019-13377, is a timing-based side-channel attack that targets the WPA3 Dragonfly handshake when incorporating Brainpool curves. Although the WiFi Alliance advocates for these curves as a security enhancement, the researchers discovered these specifications can introduce an additional set of side-channel vulnerabilities to the Dragonfly handshake process.
In an updated advisory, Vanhoef and Ronen confirm that implementations following WiFi Alliance guidelines still remain vulnerable. The researchers successfully demonstrated the feasibility of brute-forcing WiFi passwords, thus illustrating a critical flaw even when recommended security protocols are adhered to.
A second vulnerability, CVE-2019-13456, concerns the EAP-pwd (Extensible Authentication Protocol-Password) implementation in FreeRADIUS, which is widely used by organizations for user authentication. By exploiting this information leak, attackers can execute multiple EAP-pwd handshakes to glean sufficient data, enabling them to launch dictionary and brute-force attacks aimed at recovering user credentials.
The implications of these vulnerabilities are significant, especially with concerns regarding the quality of WiFi firmware implementations, such as those in Cypress chips, which have demonstrated a minimal iteration count that could exacerbate side-channel attack risks. While efforts to develop robust defenses against such attacks continue, the inherent challenge lies in implementing the Dragonfly algorithm and WPA3 without exposing further vulnerabilities, particularly in lightweight devices.
The researchers have communicated these findings to the WiFi Alliance, which is working to update the WiFi standard in hopes of establishing stronger defenses that might lead to the release of WPA3.1. This updated version would not, however, be backward compatible with existing WPA3 implementations.
The sequence of discoveries and the subsequent lack of transparency in the WiFi Alliance’s security measures suggests a need for more collaborative efforts in developing robust cybersecurity protocols. For business owners reliant on wireless networks, these findings underscore the necessity of remaining vigilant regarding the evolving landscape of cybersecurity threats.
In terms of potential tactics used during these attacks, the MITRE ATT&CK framework highlights an array of adversary techniques, such as initial access through exploiting vulnerabilities, persistence via the reuse of compromised credentials, and privilege escalation achievable through brute-force methods. As organizations navigate these threats, a comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity resilience becomes imperative for safeguarding sensitive data.