Recently, General Gregory Guillot, the head of NORTHCOM, expressed significant concerns regarding the increasing safety and security risks posed by small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) to military installations and critical infrastructure. During a press briefing, he emphasized that these risks are likely to persist for the foreseeable future and highlighted the necessity for a unified response involving federal departments, state and local authorities, and Congress. The aim is to enhance capabilities for detecting and neutralizing potential drone threats domestically.
Military officials indicated that the counter-drone measures the Pentagon might deploy for domestic security could predominantly consist of non-kinetic, “soft kill” techniques. These techniques include RF and GPS jamming, alongside relatively simple interception methods such as nets and “string streamers.” This approach stems from legal limitations regarding the use of more aggressive tactics on American soil, impacting the military’s operational scope in protecting homeland security.
General Guillot noted during a counter-drone experiment that the urgency to address these threats is accelerating at a pace outstripping existing policies and procedures. He sketched a complex landscape where regulatory challenges complicate military operations in civilian contexts, contrasting this environment with a traditional war zone.
High-ranking officials reiterated these points when the Pentagon unveiled its new counter-drone strategy in early December. One official articulated the unique challenges presented by the domestic drone environment, which includes numerous hobbyist drones that pose no threat but add to the overall congestion of airspace. This coexistence complicates the military’s ability to respond effectively, both from a legal and operational standpoint.
The legislative framework governing these military actions is grounded in a specific subsection of the U.S. Code, Title 10, particularly section 130(i). This provision delineates the military’s authority regarding the protection of facilities from unmanned aircraft and outlines permissible actions—ranging from the disruption of control signals to employing reasonable force to neutralize drones.
As concerns over drone-related threats continue to escalate, it is imperative for business owners and cybersecurity professionals to understand the possible tactics employed in these scenarios. Drawing from the MITRE ATT&CK framework, potential adversary tactics associated with the deployment of sUAS may include initial access through signal interception or the use of compromised drone systems, persistence through the installation of backdoor applications in legitimate drones, and persistence strategies aimed at maintaining control over affected areas.
The evolving landscape of drone technology and corresponding military responses underscores a critical area for business leaders to monitor. Understanding how these dynamics affect security protocols and regulatory frameworks will be central to navigating the complexities of homeland safety and preparedness against potential drone incursions in civilian environments. As regulatory and technological developments unfold, stakeholders must remain vigilant and proactive in fortifying their defenses against adversaries who may exploit emerging vulnerabilities in drone operations.
